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THE ENFORCIBILITY OF TREASURY BONDS IN BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION*
CORPORATIONs repurchase their own bonds for a variety of reasons.1 For
example, bond repurchases enable a corporation to reduce interest expense as
its need for borrowed capital decreases. Moreover, a corporation contemplat-
ing future borrowing can improve its credit rating by judicious repurchasing
to sustain the market price of its bonds.2 However, the repurchase of bonds
will entail a loss of financial flexibility unless the bonds can be reissued or
pledged as security for a corporate note. Normally an indenture authorizes a
limited number of bonds and secures them by a mortgage on all corporate
assets, including those to be obtained in the future.3 Consequently, if re-
acquired bonds cannot be reissued or pledged, repurchase permanently reduces
the capital obtainable through financing which is secured by a mortgage of the
same priority as that authorized by the indenture.4 Hence, increased financial
needs may ultimately necessitate the execution of an unsecured credit instru-
ment or a mortgage junior to the indenture mortgage. Borrowing on either
*In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), appeal docketed,
Nos. 23141-45, 2d Cir., June 1, 1954.
1. For an excellent general discussion of corporate mortgage financing, see 1 DrvWING,
THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS cc. 7-9 (5th ed. 1953). See also MCCLELLAND
& FISHER, CORPORAa MORTGAGE BOND IssuEs (1st ed. 1937).
2. Bond repurchase may also enable a corporation to meet its sinking fund obligations
economically. Bond indentures often require the mortgagor to maintain a sinking fund as
insurance for the ultimate redemption of the entire bond issue. The corporation must
make annual contributions to the fund to enable the fund's trustee to buy a specified
number of bonds, or the corporation itself may be required to repurchase and cancel a per-
centage of the outstanding bonds. In either case management is able to defray this
expense most economically by repurchasing the bonds when their market price is low
and then holding them for later cancellation or sale to the fund. For a discussion of
common sinking fund requirements, see 1 DE-WING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 239-50,
3. See, e.g., In rc Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 843 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ; 1 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 198, 209. For a discussion of bond issues with-
out these characteristics, see note 4 infra.
4. See BERLE & WARREN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATION 917 (1st ed. 1948), and authorities cited therein. Of course this will not occur
where the mortgage is of the "open-end" type. Under such a mortgage there is no
specific upper limit to the total number of bonds which may be issued and secured by the
same lien rights in the mortgaged property. However, many so-called "open-end" mort-
gages are restricted in that they limit additional bonds to a specific percentage of the
fair value of later acquired property or improvements. Where this is the case, newly
acquired property may not be sufficiently valuable to authorize issuance of the number of
bonds needed for expanding financial needs. Thus there would be in practical effect an
exhaustion of the mortgage similar to that of a closed mortgage. See 1 DEWING, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 184-86.
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type of instrument entails high interest payments.5 Moreover, stringent re-
quirements must be met before state and federal government approval can be
obtained for a new flotation of securities. 6 Thus the corporate need for the
power to reissue or pledge reacquired bonds is apparent, and most courts have
granted this power whenever a company has shown its intention to retain re-
acquired bonds for subsequent borrowing.7 However, judicial determination
that repurchased bonds in the company's treasury may be "alive" for future
financing has created confusion over their status when the corporation goes
through bankruptcy or reorganization.
In the recent case of In re Third Avenue Transit Corp.,s a company's re-
organization trustee asked a New York federal district court for a declaratory
judgment determining the status of repurchased bonds held in the corporation's
5. This is caused by the reduced salability of unsecured debentures and bonds secured
by an inferior mortgage The investor will risk his capital in these more doubtful issues
only where a relatively high interest rate is offered. For discussion of the general
attributes and investment value of second and later mortgage bonds and debentures, see
1 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 203, 226, 251.
6. See discussion of state Blue Sky Laws, particularly the description of control
over bond issues exercised by public service commissions, in 6A FzRrcnI, CYCLOPZA
PRIvATE CoRI'oRATio.s § 2656 (perm. ed. 1950); 2 JoiNs, BONDS AND Bo.w Szcurais
§§ 640-49 (4th ed. 1935). For an example of the statutory control exercised by state
public service commissions over issues of stock, bonds, and other forms of indebtedness,
see N.Y. PuBLic SERvicE LAW § 55. Federal control over mortgage financing and the
sale by corporations of securities of all types is secured by the following legislative
enactments: 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1952) (Securities Act of 1933);
53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1952) (Trust Indenture Act of 1939);
41 STAT. 494 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20a (1952) (Transportation Act). Under
§ 20a(5) of the Transportation Act, a carrier must file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission a certificate of notification setting forth certain facts upon the dispositiun,
sale, pledge, or repledge of securities described in a previous application. Thus, fur band
issues authorized by the Commission, even the repledge or reissuance of previously auth-
orized securities is subject to some control.
7. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., -277 Fed. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) ; Slupsky v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 13 (Sth Cir. 1935) ; Wash-
ington Loan & Trust Co. v. Blair, 75 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Virginia Secrities
Corp. v. Patrick Orchards, 20 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1927) ; Claflin v. The South Carolina
R.R., 8 Fed. 118 (C.C.S.C. 1880); 258 Ky. 817, 81 S.V.2d 896 (1935); Pruyne v. Adams
Furniture & Mfg. Co., 92 Hun 214, 36 N.Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1895), aff'd, 155 N.Y.
629, 49 N.E. 1103 (1898); First Security Trust Co. v. John H. Seely & Sons Co., 87
Utah 525, 51 P.2d 1060 (1935) ; Broomall v. North American Steel Co., 70 IV. Va. 591,
74 S.E. 863 (1912). Cf. In re Fifty-Four First Mortgage Bonds, 15 S.C. 304 (1830)
(reissue of matured bonds permitted). But cf. Anderson v. Pennsylvania Hotel Co., Sti
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1932) (repurchased matured bonds not reissuable). For a much-cited
statement of the principle, see 2 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 757. See also 4 Coox,
CoRPORATIONs 3396 n.4 (8th ed. 1923); 6A FLx=rHrc, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2729;
3 Tnompsox, Colu'ozrunoNs § 2401 (3d ed. 1927). For express judicial recognition of
the practical reasons for allowing reissuance, see Barry v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 34 Fed.
829, 833 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
8. 120 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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treasuryY Securities of the reorganized company were to be distributed among
creditors in proportion to the value of their enforcible claims against the in-
solvent corporation.'" The reorganization trustee, successor to the company's
title in the treasury bonds, argued that they were outstanding debts and there-
fore entitled to share in the mortgaged assets on a par with bonds publicly
held." This contention was supported by the general creditors.' 2 They stood
to benefit from a determination that the treasury bonds were outstanding and
enforcible, since the bonds would then be assets in the hands of the trustee and
subject to general creditors' claims. Thus, they could indirectly reach the
mortgaged property securing these bonds, and would therefore have more
valuable claims for purposes of reorganization. a3 But, since the mortgaged
9. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Under
a First Refunding Mortgage dated December 20, 1911, the Third Avenue Railway Co.,
predecessor of the Third Avenue Transit Corp., issued a total of $21,990,500 bonds.
$1,478,000 face amount of these bonds had been cancelled by the indenture trustee, leaving
$20,512,500 of the First Refunding Mortgage bonds uncancelled at the date of the filing
of an involuntary petition for reorganization on Oct. 25, 1948. Of this $20,512,500, the
corporation had reacquired $5,681,500-the so-called "treasury bonds" involved in the
litigation. $14,831,500 face amount of First Refunding Bonds are held by the public. Brief
for Reorganization Trustee, pp. 1-3, In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp, 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner] ; Brief for Appellant to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pp. 2-4, 1) re Third Avenue
Transit Corp., 2d Cir., appeal brief filed Aug. 6, 1954 [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant]. The Third Avenue Transit Corp. is undergoing reorganization under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1952).
10. it re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). For
a discussion of the principles governing the exchange of securities in reorganization, see
2 DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1368-81. (5th ed. 1953) ; Comment,
63 YALE L.J. 812 (1954) ; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 656 (1952) ; Comment, 51 YALE L.J.
85 (1941).
11. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 841, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
The brief for the petitioner stated that he "owned" the treasury bonds. Brief for
Petitioner, p. 1. The reply brief for the respondent pointed out that the reorganization
trustee succeeded to whatever "title" the debtor itself had in the bonds and no more, nd
that the principal issue was whether the rights of an owner devolved on the reorganization
trustee. Joint Reply Brief for the First Refunding Mortgage Representatives, pp. 1-2,
In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., supra. The reorganization trustee referred to the
treasury bonds variously as "outstanding" bonds, as bonds held without cancellation for
"investments," as "issued and outstanding" bonds, and as "live bonds." Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 3, 9, 15,16,17.
12. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The
holders of some $22,215,900 of bonds outstanding under the Adjustment Income Mortgage,
secured by a second lien on all corporate properties, a lien inferior to the lien of the
First Refunding Mortgage, supported the position of the reorganization trustee. Since
the mortgaged assets were insufficient to cover the claims of the first mortgagees, see
note 14 infra, these claims of the second mortgagees could derive no value from their
security. Consequently whatever value their claims had would be attributable to their shar-
ing in unsecured assets as general creditors. Joint Brief for Indenture Trustee and First
Refunding Bondholders, p. 1, In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., supra [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Respondent] ; Brief for Appellant, pp. 3, 4.
13. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See
articles cited note 10 supra.
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assets were of insufficient value to indemnify the public bondholders,14 the
indenture trustee sought to prevent any diminution of their security. He con-
tended that treasury bonds could never be considered "outstanding obliga-
tions."15
The court, accepting the arguments of the reorganization trustee, decreed
the bonds to be enforcible claims.' 6 Its decision was grounded upon a finding
that the corporation intended to keep the bonds uncancelled for possible future
financing.' 7 However, the holding that the bonds were enforcible need not
have made them and their security available for general creditors, since the
after-acquired property clause in the public bondholders' mortgage could have
been construed to cover treasury bonds."$ The court avoided this possibility by
applying to the bonds the New York rule that an after-acquired property
14. See letter from Frank H. Heiss, Esq., of Kelley, Drye, Newhall & Maginnes,
attorneys for the indenture trustee, to the Yale Law Journal, dated Dec. 3, 1954, on file
in Yale Law Library.
15. lit re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
In his brief the indenture trustee states: "Regardless of the intent with which they were
acquired by Third Avenue, the Treasury Bonds are not entitled to share in the secur-
ity ...." Brief for Respondent, p. 5. He argued that unissued bonds "are not outstanding
for any purpose," ibid, and that treasury bonds have the same status as unissued bonds.
Id. at 7.
16. it re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 844, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
17. Id. at 845, 846, 847. The court expressed the belief that corporations continue to
treat repurchased bonds as if they were still alive in order to support a claim that they
have not been cancelled. This would be important, said the court, "in the event of a
subsequent desire to resell the bonds." Id. at 843. Since reacquired bonds are normally
held uncancelled to provide the corporation with maximum fltxibility for future capital
needs, see text at notes 3-6 supra, the discovery of this intention was almost a foregone
conclusion.
There were three groups of treasury bonds involved in the proceedings, referred to for
convenience by the name of the particular fund moneys with which they were repurchased:
a) $1,667,000 of "Sinking Fund" bonds, so-called because the moneys used to
buy them had been set aside pursuant to three orders of the New York Public
Service Commission aimed at insuring the corporation's ability ultimately to retire
the First Refunding Mortgage Bonds. Id. at 845. The court found that the second
and third orders prohibited any other course of action than a cancellation of the
bonds. Ibd. But the court decided that the first order did not require such a
conclusion, and that the intent of the debtor to hold them alive was determinative.
Id. at 845, 846.
b) $2,520,500 of "Depreciation Fund" bonds, concerning which the court said:
"Here,. . . the debtor's intention has full sway. The debtor's intention to keep the
bonds alive was ... clear. .. ." Id. at 846.
c) $1,494,000 of "Amortization" bonds. The court stated: "There can be no
doubt that these bonds were originally outstanding and no doubt of the debtor's
intention to keep them alive." Id. at 847.
18. Once it has been determined that repurchased bonds continue as assets of the
debtor corporation while held in its treasury, they may then be capturable by an after-
acquired property clause which is written to cover securities. The First Refunding
Mortgage contained the following clause which might be construed to cover the after-
acquired treasury bonds:
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clause cannot affect a reorganization trustee's claims to personalty.'0 As a
consequence, roughly one-fifth of the mortgaged assets was released from the
mortgage lien. 20  And the court indicated that this result would be same
whether the corporation were in bankruptcy or reorganization.21
The Third Avenue Transit decision was dictated by the court's adoption of
the illogical rationale,22 unsupported outside its district,2 3 that treasury bonds
"Also any and all lines of railroad, extensions and branches, land and improvements
of any description, machinery, cars and other equipment, stock, bonds, notes and
other obligations and other property of any description whatsoever, which the Rail-
way Company may acquire by the use of bonds, or the proceeds of bonds reserved
under the subdivision (3) of Article Second of this indenture, or with the proceeds
of any property mortgaged or pledged hereunder, or otherwise acquired under the
provisions of this indenture.. ."
See letter from Frank H. Heiss, Esq., of Kelley, Drye, Newhall & Maginnes, attorneys
for the indenture trustee, to the Yale Law Journal, dated Dec. 3, 1954, on file in Yale
Law Library.
For a general discussion of the law pertaining to after-acquired property clauses, see
Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv, 635 (1939) ;
BERLE & WARREN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 916.
17 (lst ed. 1948).
19. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 195l),
The treasury bonds, if assets at all, are personalty. Under New York law an after-
acquired property clause is not effective to prevent creditors from levying on personalty
acquired after the execution of the mortgage. E.g., Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey,
142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894); New York Security Co. v. Saratoga G. & El. L. Co.,
159 N.Y. 137, 53 N.E. 758 (1899); Diana Paper Co. v. Wheeler-Green Electric Co., 228
App. Div. 577, 240 N.Y. Supp. 108 (4th Dep't 1930) ; it re Niagara Lead & Battery Co.,
202 Fed. 298 (W.D.N.Y. 1913). A bankruptcy trustee has the status which a levying credi-
tor would have under state law. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1952). A trustee appointed under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, as was the re-
organization trustee in this case, is vested with the same rights and powers as at trustee
in bankruptcy, including his status as levying creditor. Nash v. Onondaga Hotel Corp.,
140 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1944) ; 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 587 (1952). For discussion
of the various state rules governing after-acquired property clauses in real property
mortgages and chattel mortgages, see 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11170.80, 70.82 (14th ed.
1942).
20. Brief for Appellant, p. 1. Though these assets were released from the murtgagees'
lien, the court did state that "insofar as holders of the publicly held First Refunding
Mortgage Bonds were not paid in full, they would be general creditors entitled to share
in the proceeds of the mortgaged property applicable to the Treasury Bonds along with
the rest of the free assets." Thus the claims of the public bondholders to a share of
securities in the reorganized company would be based to some small degree on the value
of the assets securing the treasury bonds. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F.
Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
21. Id. at 842.
22. The court admitted as much when it said: "As a matter of common sense, the
First Refunding Bondholders' position that the Treasury Bonds cannot be enforced
against the mortgaged property seems unassailable. A man cannot owe himself money;
hence there is no debt represented by the Treasury Bonds. There can be no security




held uncanceled for future financing must ipso facto be "alive" for enforce-
ment. SEC and ICC decisions apparently recognize the irrelevancy of the
"In spite of the unassailable logic of the positions of the First Refunding Bondholders,
however, there are business practices which afford a specious argument against it and-
even more important-court decisions that, to say the least, give the First Refunding
Bondholders an uphill fight." ln re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
23. The court felt bound by two mortgage foreclosure decisions in its own district.
In American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., 277 Fed. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), $1,000,000 face amount of the first mortgage bonds had been repurchased by the
railways company, held in its treasury for a time, and then pledged as collateral security
for a loan. At the time of mortgage foreclosure, some $18,000,000 worth of first mortgage
bonds, including those pledged, were "outstanding." The unpaid balance of the loan for
which the pledged bonds were collateral was $A00,000. Certain mortgagees claimed that
the pledged bonds had been extinguished by their repurchase, but the court, finding a
corporate intent to hold the bonds alive, denied this plea. It held that a pro rata share
of the mortgaged assets must be applied to the pledged bonds with any excess over
$400,000 to return to the debtor and be available for general creditors' claims. No cases
were cited to support the holding. Judge Dimock recognized that this case might be
distinguishable on the ground that pledged bonds were involved, not treasury bonds.
In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R.T. Co., 2-3 Fed. 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1923), involved $5,092,000 face amount of bonds held in the debtor's treasury at the time
of foreclosure. Of this amount, only 20,000 had been issued and then repurchased. The
court affirmed the report of a special master who had held that this 20,000 of bonds was
entitled to share in the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. No cases were cited by the court
except its earlier decision in American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys.,
supra.
Within its own circuit the court could have found two circuit court cases which would
have given it a rationale permitting it to overrule the southern district decisions.
Judge Learned Hand had referred to treasury bonds as "not debts at all; and ... no
different from bonds never issued... ," in a cryptic opinion deciding New York Trust Co.
v. Palmer, 101 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1939). There a railway company wvas being liquidated
and the public bondholders, having been insufficiently reimbursed by their security, were
seeking to enforce as large a claim as possible against the general assets. Some re-
acquired bonds had been pledged to the indenture trustee for the bondholders' benefit in
return for a release of part of the mortgaged property. The bondholders sought to have
these pledged bonds enforced against general assets along with their claims for the
balances owed to them on their own bonds. The court rested its decision mainly on
the ground that to allow the enforcement of the pledged bonds would be to sanction
an unlawful multiplication of claims for a single debt-the balance owed the public
bondholders. This position is supported by Hitner v. Diamond State Steel Co., 176 Fed.
384 (C.C.D. Del. 1910). However, the rationale that reacquired bonds are "not debts
at all" seems to have provided an alternative basis for the court's decision. New York
Trust Co. v. Palmer, supra at 4.
In an earlier mortgage foreclosure case, New York Security & Trust Co. v. Equitable
Mortgage Co., 77 Fed. 64 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), the plaintiff sought a distributive share
of foreclosure proceeds on the basis of bond coupons which had been assigned to him by
the debtor. These coupons had been previously redeemed by the debtor from a pledgee.
The court denied the claim. It found that the plaintiff had acquired the bonds by assign-
ment rather than issuance. To ascertain the rights of the assignee, the court then con-
sidered whether the debtor-assignor could enforce these coupons, and reached the con-
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intent test.2 4 Corporate intention to hold bonds for subsequent borrowing is
germane only to the specific problem of whether repurchase precludes reissu-
ance or pledge. It has no reasonable relation to the wholly different problem
of whether treasury bonds should be enforced in bankruptcy or reorganization
so as to favor one group of creditors over another.
When considering treasury bonds in other contexts where the question is
not reissuance or pledge, courts consistently reject as a meaningless guide
the corporation's intent to retain these bonds for later financing.2 6 For ex-
ample, they have ignored corporate intent to reissue or pledge when defining
the status of reacquired bonds in relation to indenture requirements for sinking
fund contributions. Indentures frequently stipulate that the issuing corpora-
clusion that it could not. Although the court could have restricted the justification
for its holding to the simple proposition that unissued coupons are not enforcible, It
adopted the following broad language of the special master: "[I]t cannot . . . be
successfully maintained that a mortgage debtor, having become possessed of bonds or
coupons secured by its mortgage, can enforce them against the proceeds of the sale of the
mortgaged property, where such proceeds are insufficient to pay in full the other outstand-
ing bonds and coupons secured thereby." Id. at 66.
For additional authority contrary to the position taken by the district court, see Clafllu
v. The South Carolina R.R., 8 Fed. 118, 126 (C.C.S.C. 1880) (dictum by C. J. Waite) ; 4
CooK, CoaroRA&ioNs 3396 n.4 (8th ed. 1923) ; 3 JoNEs, BONDS AND BOND SEcuRaIEs § 1431
(4th ed. 1935); Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, 34 CALIf. L. RV.
536, 542 (1946). But see Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Washington Northern R.R.,
212 Fed. 776 (W.D. Wash. 1914), aff'd sub nom. Crawford v. Washington Northern R.R.,
233 Fed. 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 629 (1916) (dictum) (enforcement of
reissued bonds allowed but subordinated to other bonds of same issue).
24. In approving reorganization plans under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52
STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1952), and section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1952), these administrative agencies have, with
one exception, treated treasury bonds as nullities to be entirely omitted from participation
in the reorganized company. E.g., Rocky Mt. Fuel Co., 20 S.E.C. 24, 36 (1945) ; Asso-
ciated Gas & Electric Co., 15 S.E.C. 743, 761 (1944) ; In re Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry.,
254 I.C.C. 707, 708 n.5, 739 (1943). The Seventh Circuit accepted this last case's treatment
of treasury bonds in In re Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry., 124 F.2d 754, 760 (7th Cir.
1942), modified, 318 U.S. 523, 530 (1943). For court decisions in agreement with the
I.C.C. practice, see St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 398, 399 (8th
Cir. 1946) ; In re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 63 F. Supp. 151 (D.C.D. Minn. 1945). But cf.
In re Prudence Co., 98 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1938) (treasury bonds were recognized but re-
garded as having a lien inferior to publicly held bonds of the same issue).
25. Corporate intent to utilize reacquired matured bonds for raising capital has not
been effective to prevent the extinction of the debt upon repurchase. Once the debt
was extinguished, the bond certificate was deemed cancelled and nonreissuable. Pelham
Hall Co. v. A.B. & M. Liquidation Corp., 112 F.2d 498 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311, U.S.
704 (1940) ; In re McDermott, 115 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Anderson v. Pennsylvania
Hotel Co., 56 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1932) (dictum) ; In re Burton, 29 Fed. 637 (W.D.
Va. 1886); Cussen v. Brandt & Dunlop, 97 Va. 1, 32 S.E. 791 (1899). Contra, In re
Fifty-Four First Mortgage Bonds, 15 S.C. 304 (1880). There is much reason behind
this rule, since the debtor could conceal its inability to pay the bonds on maturity by the
device of pledging these bonds to a lending institution in return for a loan of the money
necessary to redeem these same bonds. See Pelham Hall Co. v. A.B. & M. Liquidation
Corp., supra; Anderson v. Pennsylvania Hotel Co., supra.
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tion make periodic contributions to a sinking fund.2 0 This reserve acts as in-
surance for the ultimate redemption of the entire bond issue.27 The contribu-
tions are often measured by taking either a fixed percentage of the principal
of "issued and outstanding bonds" or a stated sum for each of these bonds2 3
In determining whether treasury bonds are "issued and outstanding," courts
have construed the indenture in order to ascertain the reasonable expectations
of both bondholders and company.2 9 Thus, the corporate intent to reissue,
manifested when the bonds were repurchased, has been properly disregarded
as irrelevant.
Furthermore, courts have accepted the argument of the Internal Revenue
Service that corporate intent should not be considered in deciding when to tax
gains from the repurchase of bonds below par.30 The Commissioner, with
judicial approval, has correctly refused to view treasury bonds as subsisting
debts and has taxed the gain in the year of repurchase.31 To hold that no
gain has been realized because the corporation as issuer still owes itself as
holder the face amount of the bonds : -2 would not merely be unrealistic, but
would permit a company to choose the year for taxation of gains actually re-
ceived at repurchase. 33
The adoption of the corporate intention test in Third Avenue Transit re-
sulted in a holding without policy justification. Admittedly, no investor in
mortgage bonds should generally expect to receive a proportional share of the
liquidated security larger than the fractional relation his holdings bear to all
26. See 1 DEwiNG, THE FINANCIAL PoLicY OF CORPORATIONS 239"40 (5th ed. 1953).
27. Id. at 239. See also 2 JoNEs, BONDS AND BOND SECUUTIES § 619 (4th ed. 1935).
28. 1 DEwiNG, op. cit. supra note 26, at 241-246. For a typical sinking fund provision,
see Bankers Trust Co. v. Denver Tramway Co., 192 App. Div. 794, 795, 183 N.Y. Supp.
326, 327 (1st Dep't 1920).
29. Bankers Trust Co. v. Denver Tramway Co., 233 N.Y. 604, 135 N.E. 936, modify-
ing 192 App. Div. 794, 183 N.Y. Supp. 326 (1st Dep't 1920) (not issued and outstanding);
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. New York T. Co., 215 App. Div. 122, 213 N.Y. Supp.
314 (1st Dep't 1926) (issued and outstanding) ; New York Trust Co. v. Portland Ry.,
197 App. Div. 422, 189 N.Y. Supp. 346 (1st Dep't 1921) (same); Columbia Gas &
Electric Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 152 App. Div. 5, 136 N.Y. Supp. 840 (1st Dep't
1912) (same).
30. E.g., Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1944);
Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. Helvering, 75 F2d 663, (D.C. Cir. 1935); American Brake
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 19 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y.
1936); Houston Natural Gas Corp., 9 T.C. 570 (1947). These cases prevented corpora-
tions from using postponement of retirement to choose the year for taxation. For a
history of the treatment of this problem by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service,
see Commissioner v. Pittsburgh & W.V. Ry. 172 F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1949), especially
at p. 1015 n.13.
31. See cases cited note 30 supra.
32. This was the company's contention in Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Commissioner,
145 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1944). The debtor claimed tfhat the reacquired bonds were held
as investments, and simultaneously carried them as liabilities on the company's books. See
also, e.g., 'Montana, NV. & S.R.R. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1935).
33. See note 30 supra.
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bonds authorized by the indenture, whether issued or not.8 4 However, where
mortgaged assets are insufficient to reimburse the bondholders in full, they
have a right to anticipate that their prior lien will prevent junior claimants
from sharing in the security., Moreover, the reasonable expectations of
general creditors, judged at the time they extend credit, undoubtedly do not
include the subjection of mortgaged assets to their claims before the mortgagees
are fully repaid.8 0 At best, general creditors can expect that repurchase will
enhance their chances for participation in mortgaged assets by reducing the
outstanding claims of senior mortgagees. Thus, Third Avenue Transit sanc-
tioned a windfall to general creditors and thwarted the reasonable expections
of public bondholders.
The inequity of the decision is further highlighted by its unjustifiable frustra-
tion of the indenture's after-acquired property clause. It is true that under
New York law the recording of a mortgage containing such a clause will not
prevent a levying creditor from avoiding a bondholder's lien on after-acquired
personalty.8 1 Therefore the Third Avenue Transit holding that the mortga-
34. Claflin v. The South Carolina R.R., 8 Fed. 118, 124 <C.C.S.C. 1880). The investor
in bonds is given constructive notice of the number of bonds authorized under the
mortgage indenture. He must anticipate that the corporation may issue all the authorized
bonds, thereby reducing the security behind each bond to the allowable minimum. See
Note, 47 YALE L.J. 480, 481 (1938), for a statement of this proposition with respect to
holders of mortgage participation certificates.
35. E.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd,
228 U.S. 482 (1913). These decisions have formulated the "absolute priority" rule which
governs the distribution of securities of the reorganized corporation among creditors and
stockholders of the old company. The rule denies participation by junior claimants when
"full" compensation has not been received by seniors. It will be applied in bankruptcy
reorganizations under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 STAT. 1471 (1933), 11 U.S.C.
§ 205 (1952), see Ecker v. Western Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943) ; and under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1952) (formerly
section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 STAT. 912 (1934)), see Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., supra.
In mortgage foreclosure proceedings the lien holders must expect to be paid in order
of their priority, with juniors sharing only after seniors have been fully reimbursed.
WALSH, MORTGAGES § 79 (1st ed. 1934).
36. The widely accepted "absolute priority" rule as well as the distribution normally
made in mortgage foreclosure proceedings probably determines the expectations of general
creditors. See note 35 mupra. They receive higher interest on the money they lend for
the specific reason that they are willing to sacrifice security for the prospect of an
increased return.
37. See notes 18 and 19 supra. This rule is severely criticized in an article by Harlan
F. Stone, The "Equitable" Mortgage in New York, 20 COL. L. REV. 519 (1920). See also
WALSH, MORTGAGES 57-63 (1st ed. 1934), where the New York rule is described not
only as a minority position, but also as out of harmony with a line of cases in New
York itself extending from Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 811 (1890). The
Kribbs case holds that recordation of a mortgage containing an after-acquired property
clause protects the mortgagees' lien on after-acquired property by giving constructive
notice to a subsequent purchaser. That the position of the levying creditor who advanced
money without reliance on chattels to be acquired in the future should be more favorable
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gees' after-acquired property clause did not negate the right of the reorgani-
zation trustee to the bonds seems superficially correct, since bonds are
personalty and a reorganization trustee has all the rights of a levying creditor.a
However, the effects of the holding are contrary to the spirit of the New York
rule. The security for the bonds included not only after-acquired personalty,
but also assets which a reorganization trustee cannot reach under the New
York rule-personalty and realty acquired before the execution of the mortgage
and after-acquired realty.39 But in Third Avenue Transit, the trustee did reach
such property by using the treasury bonds as a conduit for withdrawing assets
from under the mortgage lien, a nullification of contract which the bondholders
could not have reasonably expected.4 0 Since the security coverage of most inden-
than that of the innocent purchaser of those chattels is called a "curious legal incongruity"
by Stone. Stone, supra at 528. Stone's article concludes by recommending that the
mortgage lien on after-acquired property, including chattels, be upheld where the mortgage
having the after-acquired property clause is properly recorded. Id. at 535. Cohen and
Gerber strongly advocate the same solution. Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property
Clause, 87 U. PA. L. Rzv. 635 (1939). For further citation of cases supporting the
majority and minority positions, see WALSH, supra at 60 n.21; 4 CoLLiER, BA-n urcy
§ 70.82 (14th ed. 1942).
38. See note 19 supra.
39. For a statement of the security coverage of the mortgage, see letter from Frank
I. Heiss, Esq., of Kelley, Drye, Newhall & Maginnes, attorneys for the indenture
trustee, to the Yale Law Journal, dated Dec. 3, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library. The
First Refunding 'Mortgage %was executed on Feb. 8, 1912 immediately after a reorganiza-
tion of the Third Avenue Railroad Co., predecessor of both the Third Avenue Railway
Co. and the present debtor, Third Avenue Transit Corp. Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-3.
At the date of the mortgage execution the mortgagor was possessed of all the assets of
the old railway company. Ibid. Therefore, it is safe to assume that a part of the mort-
gaged property now held by the indenture trustee is not after-acquired property.
The known cases in which the New York rule has been applied have without exception
concerned the mortgage of after-acquired personalty and have stated the rule as being
restricted to personalty. See cases cited note 19 supra. In their article, Cohen and Gerber
state: "An attempt to mortgage land to be acquired in the future should always be
upheld.... The great weight of authority favors this view." Cohen & Gerber, The Aflcr-
Acqzdrcd Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 654 (1939). See also 5 T F:Fr v,
REAL PROPERTY § 1385 (3d ed. 1939), for statement and cases supporting the mortgage of
after-acquired real property.
Of course, where no after-acquired property clause is included in the mortgage in-
denture, both realty and personalty acquired after the mortgage execution could be ob-
tained by the reorganization trustee.
40. Since the New York after-acquired personalty rule is in disrepute, see note 37
supra, the court was ill-advised to extend its operation. A closer look at the substance
of the claim advanced in behalf of the treasury bonds would have revealed that in reality
the creditors were not levying upon the bonds, but upon the security of the bonds, made
up in part of assets exempt from the rule as it stood.
Despite the New York after-acquired property rule, an exception is made in the case
of public utility corporations, which allows such clauses to be valid. Ithaca Trust Co.
v. Ithaca Traction Corp., 248 N.Y. 332, 162 N.E. 93 (1928); American Brake Shoe Q
Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., 277 Fed. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). However, Judge Dimock
found that the exception did not cover the treasury bonds for it was limited to "property
necessary and appropriate for the operation of [the public utility's] franchises." In re
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tures is similar to that of the mortgage involved in Third Avenue Transit,41 appli-
cation of the rule of this case will generally result in the circumvention of after-
acquired property clauses. 42
The Bankruptcy Act clearly does not contemplate treasury bonds as being
enforcible claims. Sections 556 and 558 disqualify a creditor of a company
from being its reorganization or bankruptcy trustee.43 Yet the trustee is a
bondholder creditor under the Third Avenue Transit rule, since he succeeds
to the corporation's title to the enforcible bonds.44 Moreover, the Act provides
Third Avenue Transit Corp., 120 F. Supp. 839, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), citing Pintsch
Compressing Co. v. Buffalo Gas Co., 280 Fed. 830, 836 (2d Cir. 1922). Had the court
chosen to look behind the bonds to their security, the after-acquired property clause
would clearly have been valid under this exception.
In accepting the position of the reorganization trustee regarding the New York rule,
the court left unanswered an alternative contention. The second mortgagees claimed
that the after-acquired property clause in the First Refunding Mortgage was ineffective
to subject the treasury bonds to its lien because bonds issued under a mortgage cannot
be subject to its lien. See In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., supra at 847. This conten-
tion would probably not have held up under the court's scrutiny. It is directly opposed
to Crawford v. Washington Northern R.R., 233 Fed. 961 (9th Cir. 1916). In that
case a railroad company had contracted with a second mortgagee to reissue to him re-
acquired bonds of a prior mortgage. The second mortgagee was held to have no present
right to the reacquired bonds because they came under the after-acquired property clause
of the first mortgage-the mortgage under which the bonds had been issued.
41. Generally, where any mortgage is executed after the corporation has been in
existence for a time, the mortgaged assets will include some property owned prior to
the date of the mortgage.
Berle and Warren state: "Most corporate mortgages do not attempt to convey specific
items of real or personal property owned by the mortgagor. Rather do they mortgage
all of the assets of the corporation then or thereafter owned, whether real or personal,
tangible or intangible." BERLE & WARREN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW or Busl-
NESS ORGANIZATION 908 (1st ed. 1948). See also Note, 49 HARv. L. REV. 947, 948 (1936).
42. The inequity of the decision is further emphasized by the fact that a large part of
the actual moneys exchanged for the treasury bonds had been segregated by the transit
corporation for maintenance, replacement, and renewal of the mortgage security. Assuming
the fund quotas were set up in accordance with depreciation needs, the allocation of these
moneys to the repurchase of bonds may have resulted in a reduction of the market value
of the mortgage security. In this event, the public bondholder might claim that their
use to reacquire bonds constituted a breach of the indenture maintenance covenant. See
note 17 supra.
A further anomalous consequence was that the sinking fund, created under Public
Service Commission orders to protect the public bondholders, ultimately resulted in the
diversion of their security, since the fund monies were partially invested in the treasury
bonds. See note 17 supra.
43. The Bankruptcy Act provides: "Any trustee appointed under this chapter shall
be disinterested . . . ." 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1952).
"A person shall not be deemed disinterested, for the purposes of sections 556 and 557
of this title, if
(1) he is a creditor.., of the debtor ... ." 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1952),
44. The title to whatever assets the corporation has is taken over by the reorganiza.
tion trustee pending acceptance of the reorganization plan. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 586 (1952). If the treasury bonds are assets, then the reorganization trustee would
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that "two-thirds in amount of the claims filed and allowed" must assent prior
to court acceptance of any reorganization plan.45 Under this provision, only
real parties in interest are allowed to exercise control over reorganization. 40
But under the Third Avenue Transit rule, the reorganization trustee is holder
of an enforcible and hence presumably provable claim; thus, a literal inter-
pretation of the Act would include him among those given control over
the distribution of rights in the reorganized company.47 Perhaps it is the
difficulty of harmonizing the enforcibility of treasury bonds with the evident
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act which has led the ICC and SEC to treat
these bonds as nullities in reorganization."8
The one apparently substantial argument in favor of Third Avenue Transit
is that holding treasury bonds nonenforcible would jeopardize their reissu-
ability. Reissuability has been justified by the rationale that after a bond is
issued it has all the attributes of an outstanding bond until formal cancel-
lation.49 Hence a repurchased but uncancelled bond is "alive" and may be
resold or pledged. Since nonenforcibility would deprive treasury bonds of an
attribute of subsisting bonds, strict application of the above rationale would
deny reissuability. However, decisions focusing on issues other than reissu-
ability indicate that a bond need not be "alive" for all purposes to be "alive"
for one. For e-xample. courts have held that while certain reacquired bonds
retained in a sinking fund could not be reissued, they were "alive" for pur-
poses of measuring sinking fund contributions.00 Furthermore, while courts
have title to them and hence become a creditor. See section 105(4) of the Bankruptcy
Act which defines a creditor as "the holder of any claim." 52 SrAr. 883 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 506(4) (1952).
45. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1952).
46. Only those creditors and stockholders "affected" by the plan are to be given
control over it. 52 STAT. 884, 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 579 (1952).
47. Perhaps the reorganization trustee would be denied the right to vote on the
strength of section 203 of the Bankruptcy Act. 52 STAT. S94 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 603
(1952). This section requires that all votes on acceptance of the plan not made in good
faith be disqualified. Considering his position, the reorganization trustee might be unable
to meet this requirement. For another possible ground upon which the trustee might be
disqualified from voting, see note 46 supra. For a complete discussion of the requirements
of §ection 179 of the Bankruptcy Act concerning acceptance of the reorganization plan,
and the citation of pertinent articles and cases, see 6 CoTznF BArmuprcY f]7.35 (14th
ed. 1942).
48. See note 28 supra.
49. See Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R.T. Co., 283 Fed. 221, 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1923); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., 277
Fed. 261, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Contra, New York Trust Co. v. Palmer, 101 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1939). Though part of the reacquired bonds could still be reissued under the terms of
the indenture, this did not deter Judge Learned Hand from referring to them as "not
debts at all." Id. at 4.
50. New York Trust Co. v. Portland Ry. 197 App. Div. 422, 189 N.Y. Supp. 346
(Ist Dep't 1921); Columbia Gas & Electric Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 152 App.
Div. 5, 136 N.Y. Supp. 840 (1st Dep't 1912). These cases also held that the bonds were
"alive" to the extent that interest on them had to be paid to the sinking fund.
On sinking fund bonds and the mortgagor's contribution computation, see text at nute
29 supra. See also 2 JoNEs, BONDS AxD BOND SECUEITIES § 758 (4th ed. 1935).
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have consistently permitted treasury bonds to be reissued,5 1 such bonds have
concurrently been held cancelled for income tax computations 52 and, in at
least one case, for sinking fund contributions.
5 3
Two theories could be used to reject enforcibility without denying reissu-
ability. First, the lien rights of reacquired bonds can be viewed as suspended.
For where there is no debt, lien rights are justifiably withdrawn."' Upon
reissuance and a recreation of the debt, the mortgage lien reattaches." Second,
repurchase can be regarded as simply returning the bond to the same position
as that occupied by those which are authorized but as yet unissued." Such
bonds are not considered existing debts until issued. 7 Neither rationale pre-
cludes reissuance of the treasury bonds.58 Yet both deny them the status of
enforcible debts.55
51. See note 7 supra.
52. See text at notes 30-33 supra. For a treatment of some of the tax problems con-
cerning treasury stock, see Moore, Are Dividends of Treasury Stock Considered to Be
Taxable Income?, 97 J. AccouNTANcy 179 (1954).
53. Bankers Trust Co. v. Denver Tramway Co., 233 N.Y. 604, 135 N.E. 936 (1922).
For the relation of these bonds to sinking fund computations, see text at note 28 supra.
See also Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
where the court followed the Bankers Trust Co. decision and held that reissuable treasury
stock was not "issued and outstanding" for purposes of the company's bonus plan require-
ments.
54. The court in Third Avenue Transit admits the "common sense" of this position.
See note 22 supra. Although the bonds may be "alive" for certain corporate purposes in-
cluding reissue, it is difficult to maintain the contention that the debt itself actually
continues. See New York Trust Co. v. Palmer, 101 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1939); Claflin v.
The South Carolina R.R., 8 Fed. 118, 124 (C.C.S.C. 1888) (dictum); RESTATEMEN:T,
CONTRAcrS § 432(1) (1932).
55. Claflin v. The South Carolina R.R., 8 Fed. 118, 126 (C.C.S.C. 1888) (dictum).
This was a case where holders of second mortgage bonds disputed the first mortgage lien
of holders of first mortgage bonds issued after the execution of the second mortgage.
The court held that the second mortgagees had no claim to priority over any holders of
first mortgage bonds. Although no reissued bonds were involved, Chief Justice Waite's
opinion includes them within the scope of the principle applied by the court. He stated:
"The question is thus distinctly presented whether bonds then in the hands of the company,
or which afterwards got there, could be issued or reissued so as to, carry with them a
lien under the first mortgage as against the second." Id. at 124. "Here the bonds . . .
were intended as articles of commerce, to be bought and sold ...passed from hand to
hand .. . [W]hen in the hands of the company their lien under the mortgage was
suspended; but the moment they were out in the usual course of business, it again tool.
effect as of the time the mortgage was given. Any other rule than this would materially
impair the market value of this class of instruments, and tend to defeat the very object
of their execution." Id. at 126.
56. See Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, 34 CALIF. L. RLV. 536,
542 (1946); New York Trust Co. v. Palmer, 101 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1939).
57. E.g., Zimmermann v. Timmermann, 193 N.Y. 486, 86 N.E. 540 (1908) ; Equitable
Trust Co. v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power Co., 228 Fed. 516 (D. Idaho
1915), aff'd, 245 Fed. 697 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 513 (1918).
58. See notes 53 and 54 supra.
59. Bonds which have been authenticated but never issued by the corporation are not
considered enforcible claims in liquidations. E.g., Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v.
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The application of the Third Avenue Transit rule will allow a corporation,
by holding its repurchased bonds, to effect in bankruptcy or reorganization the
shifting of mortgaged assets from senior to junior creditors. This possibility
leaves a fog of uncertainty for investors. Since, in this area, equity does not
conflict with certainty, the court should have denied enforcibility by adopting
the common sense position that a corporation cannot become its own creditor
by holding treasury bonds. 0°
Brooklyn R.T. Co., 288 Fed. 221, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ; Trust Co. v. United Boxboard Co.,
213 N.Y. 334, 107 N.E. 574 (1915), reversing 162 App. Div. 855, 148 N.Y. Supp. 100 (1st
Dep't 1914).
60. See note 22 supra. For a case holding that a corporation cannot become its own
stockholder by retaining repurchased stock in its treasury, see Borg v. International Silver
Co., 11 F.2d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1925). Two authorities on corporations take a very narrow
view of the rights of the corporation as holder of its own stock, a problem similar to the defi-
nition of the status of treasury bonds. They would not view the treasury shares as assets, but
only as providing an opportunity to acquire new assets if anyone wishes to buy the stack.
BALLANTiNE, CoapoRATIoNs § 260 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Hills, Federal Taxation vs. Corporation
Law, 12 Wis. L. R-v. 280, 299 (1937).
